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RESUMEN: El artículo aborda el análisis del reconocimiento de los sistemas de inteligencia 
artificial como sujetos de derecho. El artículo confirma la afirmación de que por el momento no hay 
criterios objetivos para el reconocimiento o la negativa a reconocer algo por el sujeto de la ley. El 
autor llega a la conclusión de que la inteligencia artificial formal puede ser reconocida como sujeto 
de derecho de manera similar a la capacidad legal de una entidad jurídica. Debido a las diferencias 
existentes entre las propiedades del hombre y el sistema intelectual, la humanidad no tiene la 
obligación de reconocer tales sistemas como sujetos de derecho. 
PALABRAS CLAVES: Capacidad jurídica, inteligencia artificial, derecho de alta tecnología, 
sujeto de derecho. 




The study was performed with the financial support of the Russian Federal Property Fund in the framework of 
the scientific project No. 18-29-16129.  
2 
AUTHORS:   
1. Ph.D. R.I. Dremliuga. 
2. Ph.D. Alexey Yu. Mamychev. 
3. Researcher. O.A. Dremliuga.  
4. Senior Lect. Yulia S. Matyuk. 
ABSTRACT: The article deals with the analysis of the recognition of artificial intelligence systems 
as subjects of law. The article substantiates the assertion that at the moment there are no objective 
criteria for recognition or refusal to recognize something by the subject of law. The author comes to 
the conclusion that formally artificial intelligence can be recognized as a subject of law in a similar 
way to the legal capacity of a legal entity. Due to the existing differences between the properties of 
man and the intellectual system, humanity does not have an obligation to recognize such systems as 
the subject of law. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
Currently, the topics of the digital revolution, a cardinal technological renewal of society, a 
fundamental change in the nature and direction of the development of social relations dominate in 
scientific and popular science publications. What is behind that revolution?  
Any revolution is associated with the emergence of new subjects of socio-political, legal, economic 
and other vital functions of society, which went to the forefront of history, moved the world and 
technological progress. Today, this “process of subjectification” is at the center of social and 
humanitarian reflection; the most dramatic changes in the organization and functioning of social 
systems, the breaking and reassembly of the legal and political systems, the rule of law, etc. are 
associated with it. Fairly in this regard, A. Magun argues that any fundamental changes in society 
begin with the question of the subject, during the revolution “the subject is mobilized” or 
“subjectified,” symbolically established (for example, the institution of a citizen and his political and 
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legal status in the French revolution); and then “together with other subjects” creates a new system 
of organization and the order of relations [1, p. 56]. Another example: the modern political 
philosophy of Jacques Ranciere is all built around two key concepts: the “public scene” and the 
“process of subjectification”. He treats politics as, “first of all, a conflict over the existence of a 
common scene, the existence and quality of those who are present on it ... There is a place for 
politics because those who do not have the right to be counted as speaking beings force themselves 
to consider and establish them as such community” [2, p. 52]. 
Let us summarize: drastic changes in people's thinking have always been accompanied by the 
emergence of new entities, their conflict with the existing system of social, legal, economic and 
other subjectivity, as well as the subsequent assertion of their rights and status, which entailed the 
formation of a fundamentally different configuration of legal, political, economic and another 
organization of society. 
In addition, revolutionary transformations have always been associated with the event the new 
subjects of history appeared (ontologized) through and officially manifested in intersubjective 
reality. For example, the event of the French revolution is considered to be the capture of the 
Bastille, as a historical event, starting a countdown to a new era. This historical event interrupts the 
usual course of things, introduces, as the Slava Zizek aptly puts it, a fundamentally new 
“phenomenon without solid existence” [3], which does not take place in the previous system of 
socio-political coordinates (depending on the dictionary used, this event is designated in many 
teachings in different ways - a point of singularity, a change of paradigms, universals, epistemes, 
etc.). 
In this sense, "revolution has come to pass," and "the future has come." However, the future, to 
paraphrase the famous science fiction writer W. Gibson, due to the intensity and fragmentation of 
the ongoing technological and social processes, is not very evenly distributed according to the 
present / postmodern time. This is the difference between the modern technological revolution and 
previous eras. Post-modern artificial intelligence systems, digital algorithms, and robotic 
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technologies fundamentally change the landscape of social life. The rapid convergence of the social 
and the technological aspects are taking place, and new subjects of history and new objects of 
security are entering the forefront. J. Urry is right saying that "the future comes before it was 
realized by the relevant actors" [4].  
In general, discussions about the emergence of a new subject of history most directly affect the 
general theory of law and politics. Battles and disputes arise over the status, role, and key 
characteristics of digital actors. As is known, the legal personality of a person is universally 
recognized as something natural. Since the law is the creation of the human mind, it is formed taking 
into account human abilities and qualities. The anthropocentric system of regulatory rules has been 
developed over the centuries and is based on human needs and characteristics, such as the ability to 
feel, the ability to intend, and the ability to be aware of what is happening. Therefore, the main 
arguments against the recognition of artificial intelligence systems (hereinafter AI) as subjects of 
law are concentrated around the absence in intellectual systems of some critical elements of legal 
personality inherent in man. Some authors define such grounds as the missing-something arguments 
[5, p. 1262].  
Nevertheless, today people, things, machines together form special modes of functioning, specific 
relationships, in the context of which each of these entities is formed, mediated, objectified, and 
determined. These cardinal changes require fundamentally new security systems, new legislative 
regulation, other deontological coding systems, and technical regulations for the creation, 
development, and application of artificial intelligence systems, robotic technologies, and 
autonomous digital algorithmic systems. The latter are able to ensure safe conditions for specific 
relations between technologies and people who jointly act not only as agents but also as architects of 






Overview of approaches and theoretical and conceptual foundations of the study. 
Modern specialized literature, within the framework of political [6; 7; eight; 9], legal [10; eleven; 
12; 13], sociological [14; 15; sixteen; 17] and philosophical discourses [18; nineteen; 20; 21], raises 
the question of the transformation of the theory of both the political, economic, social subject, and 
the subject of law (legal theory of the subject) [22; 23; 24]. The spread of digital technologies, 
autonomous algorithmic systems, robots, their use in organizing the political process (for example, 
an election company, elections, etc.), in the interaction of people as digital intermediaries (mediating 
the digital relationship of two or more people) or as real actors ( for example, legal consultant, 
digital assistant, autopilot, etc.) significantly changes the traditional social relations and social 
interaction. 
Modern literature and theoretical and methodological approaches, offering both a justification for 
this problem and representing the directions of its solution can conditionally be divided into three 
main groups. 
The first group of approaches justifies that a modern society at the stage of the information 
revolution and the digital transformation of social relations undergoes the formation of 
fundamentally objects that not only activate and stimulate the conscious and volitional activity of a 
person but also act as objects of legal relations and are closely intertwined with legitimate interests 
of citizens. The formation and dissemination of these digital objects lead to a meaningful 
transformation of the theory and practice of legal relations, structure, and types of the latter. At the 
same time, it is substantiated that a new (updated, meaningfully expanded) theory of legal relations 
should model the functioning of autonomous digital technologies as intelligent systems that perform 




The second group of studies is associated, on the one hand, with the issue of security and ensuring 
human rights and freedoms in the era of digital technology development [27], and, on the other, with 
ethical standards and moral requirements that encode the process of creating and implementing 
digital technologies in public life [28]. In this regard, two interrelated issues are discussed: 
- firstly, the need to formalize these ethical, moral norms and standards, which should be adequate to 
the specific relations and direction of development of digitalization processes, as well as fit into (or 
at least take into account) the current value-regulatory system of society (national and international 
legal levels);  
- secondly, the need to predict and model the impact of the above norms, standards, and 
requirements on the development of robotic technologies and digital technologies. Currently, 
projects of such ethical coding of the development of digital technologies have only started forming. 
For example, the version of the Ethically Aligned Design ethical standard for the creation of robots 
and artificial intelligence of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) that 
substantiates that autonomous devices and intelligent systems should operate on the basis of a 
system of human value-normative and ethical regulators, in accordance with the universal standard 
of human rights and freedoms [29].  
Currently, a whole group of researchers and analysts are substantiating the need to formulate a 
universal (global) standard for the development of digital technologies and autonomous robotic 
systems, which would first be general in nature and form universal framework normative and value 
requirements and ethical standards in this area. For example, a number of leading countries in the 
field of the digital transformation of public relations have formed the European Framework 
Declaration, which defines not only the general principles of cooperation in the creation, 
development, and implementation of artificial intelligence systems, but also defines universal ethical 
standards in their use [30].  
The third group of studies argues that the digital transformation of public relations initiates the 
formation of new objects and subjects of national and international security. At the same time, it is 
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substantiated that these cardinal changes require fundamentally new security systems, a rethinking 
of the theory of social and legal responsibility, and new legislative regulation. The latter is able to 
create safe conditions for specific relations between technologies and people, to form adequate 
regimes of responsibility, etc. [31]; for example, it is proposed to create international and national 
systems of liability insurance for harm to health, rights, freedoms, the legitimate interests of legal 
entities in the process of using robotic technologies and introducing artificial intelligence systems. 
The pace of development and the level of autonomy of the latter makes the problem of identifying 
the guilty subject responsible for the damage a very relevant and complicated procedure. In this 
regard, there is a need to develop a system of compulsory insurance of risks and potential threats 
associated with the functioning of digital technologies and robotic systems. 
There is also another difficulty. The very concept of “artificial intelligence” is quite vague and, as a 
rule, is used in many studies as a scientific metaphor, without any clear conceptualization, as a 
matter of course. Moreover, an analysis of modern publications on this issue shows that even in 
cases where this concept is meaningfully described, it remains, as W. Connolly said, “an essentially 
contested concept” [32], unable to “grasp” at once a variety of semantic variations and practically 
developed technologies. In addition, the latter is also associated with the fact that the “artificial 
intelligence” system is characterized by “fluidity” (that is, it constantly “slides, changes its shape 
and relevant contexts” [33]) and “permeability” (i.e. can be integrated and converged with other 
systems and technologies [34; 35]). There are other conceptual difficulties associated with spreading 
of systems of strong and weak artificial intelligence, its various bases (digital algorithms, neural 
systems, etc. [36]).  
Main part. 
The logic of researchers who argue against the provision of legal capacity to artificial intelligence 
systems is simple. AI does not possess qualities essential for subjectivity, which include: soul, 
consciousness, feelings, ability to intend, desires, interests, or anything else. If AI demonstrates 
behavior that may be evidence of the mentioned qualities, it simply means that the system imitates 
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human behavior, “but the simulation of a thing is not the thing itself” [37, p. 1262]. Similar 
arguments dominate research work as evidence against the recognition of intellectual systems as 
subjects of moral or legal rules [38; 39; 40]. 
Proponents of endowing intellectual systems with legal capacity most often use the analogy with 
legal entities, animals, children, or legally incompetent people [41; 42; 43]. Legal entities, children, 
and legally incompetent people are generally recognized as legal entities. They can have rights and 
obligations, but most modern legal systems significantly limit the range of their rights and 
obligations. Despite the struggle for the recognition of animal rights [44; 45], recognition of their 
legal capacity is still in the process. Although some precedents already exist abroad (for example, an 
Argentine judge recognized chimpanzee Cecil as the subject of law [46]), when the question of the 
legal capacity of animals is resolved positively, in general, they are not recognized as holders of 
rights and obligations. 
The debate about the legal capacity of artificial intelligence exists not only on the pages of scientific 
journals. For example, this issue is addressed in the recommendations of the Civil Law Commission 
of the European Parliament. The cited political document says: “ultimately, the autonomy of robots 
raises the question of their nature in the light of existing legal categories - whether they should be 
considered as individuals, legal entities, animals or other existing entities of law - or a new category 
should be created with its own characteristics and accepted consequences in the context of the 
distribution of rights and obligations, including liability for damage” [47]. Although this document 
is not legally binding, it is an unequivocal sign that the issue of the legal capacity of artificial 
intelligence is included in the political agenda of the European Union. 
Another document that addresses the legal capacity of intelligent systems is the US Department of 
Defense Guide to International Humanitarian Law. The article 6.5.9.3 of this document “Obligations 
of distinction and proportionality applicable to persons, not to weapons” states that “the law of war 
does not require that weapons determine the legitimacy of their actions, even if they can be 
described as capable of accepting legally significant decisions, for example, whether to start 
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shooting or to choose and hit the target” [48]. Some researchers consider this a sign that “robotic 
weapons will never become a subject of law”, but this guide is only an official interpretation of 
international humanitarian law. Like any other interpretation of international law, it can develop 
over time [49; 50]. In general, the existing official interpretation does not exclude the possibility of 
recognizing the legal personality of the “smart machine” in the future.  
In the case of criminal law, disputes about legal capacity are more combative. From the point of 
view of the state, criminal law is an extremely important part of the law, as it relates to the most 
serious cases of violation of social norms. If the crime is committed, the state has the right and 
obligation to intervene, despite the desire of the offender and the victim.  
As for the AI system, the question arises whether it can be accountable and punishable in terms of 
criminal law? The main proponent of the criminal liability of AI believes that it can. In his book 
“Responsibility for crimes using artificial intelligence systems”, the author draws an analogy with 
the concept of criminal liability of legal entities. Since such a legal fiction as the legal personality of 
a legal entity may exist in criminal law (for example, criminal liability of legal entities exists in the 
criminal law of Australia, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Israel, Canada, China, USA, France, 
etc. In Russia, legal entities are not subjects of criminal law), a similar scheme should be applied to 
intelligent systems. In accordance with the opinion of the said researcher, AI can meet all the basic 
requirements for criminal prosecution [51]. 
In addition, the above researcher offers a punishment system that will be applicable in the case of 
AI. He even suggests that it would be possible to apply the measure of imprisonment to intelligent 
software and hardware. The author concludes that “subject to the nature of punishment through 
imprisonment, a practical action that can lead to the same consequences as imprisonment when 
applied to the AI system is to disable the AI system for a certain period. During this period, no 
actions related to the freedom of AI are allowed, and therefore, its (artificial intelligence) freedom is 
limited” [51, p. 197]. 
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Despite harsh criticism of the above ideas, almost every article regarding the legal capacity of AI 
contains at least one indisputable statement in the works of the aforementioned author. In fact, if 
some legal system decides to recognize something or someone as a subject of law, then there is no 
reason against doing it. History knows many examples when idols or geographical objects [43, p. 
280] were recognized as subjects of law. Formally, at least one intellectual system has received the 
status of a subject of law in Saudi Arabia [52].  
As one foreign researcher rightly notes, “when the legal system provides legal rights and obligations 
to a legal entity, it decides to treat this legal entity as if it was an individual. This is a kind of 
pretense rule, according to which legal systems can decide on the legal personality of an object, 
regardless of whether it is really a subject” [43, p. 278]. This does not mean that one declaration is 
enough, but it means that there is no list of criteria for recognizing or not recognizing something as a 
subject of law. 
The basis for the recognition of something as a subject of law could be the rules of morality. Since 
law and morality are means of social control, they are closely related. This does not mean that both 
social regulators should correlate with each other but at least the legislator should take moral 
standards into account. An immoral rule of law is likely to be violated frequently. For example, 
since the mid-1960s, some literature was banned in Soviet countries, but people often copied it, 
rewriting and transmitting to each other. Thus, they violated the criminal law because they believed 
that the law did not comply with moral standards (talking about underground press). Moreover, the 
above analysis of the views of opponents and supporters of the legal capacity of AI shows that the 
arguments are often within the sphere of morality. 
It seems that the two main issues in the field of morality are whether a person has a moral obligation 
to provide AI with legal capacity and whether AI can be subject to moral standards. Some authors 
prefer to rely on a very broad concept of some subjects of moral standards, which may include 
robots. For example, one of the researchers believes that when we exclude robots capable of social 
communication from the generally accepted concept of moral subjects, it will be similar to how we 
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infringed any group of people on the rights “because of their race, their religiosity, their 
functionality or even their gender” [53, p. 385]. This comment may be too emotional, but it 
demonstrates that people tend to declare their moral obligations to robots. 
The problem is that morality, like law, stems from human capabilities, limitations, and 
characteristics. Ethics and morality are a set of social rules based on the human value system. Moral 
rules often stem from our needs, fears, etc. It is immoral to “turn off” a person because you cannot 
“turn on” him after that. Some authors observe that all modern theories of ethics (deontological 
ethics, consequentialism or utilitarianism, ethics of virtue) are anthropocentric. “Even recent 
innovations in the field of environmental ethics and animal rights, despite the fact that they seem 
less anthropocentric, are still firmly based on our own human interests” [54, p. 51]. 
It should be noted that companies that recognize certain groups of people or animals as the subject 
of the law are mainly based on the similarity of these groups with entities that already have legal 
capacity. For example, fighters for the legal capacity of chimpanzees often appeal to the fact that 
chimpanzees possess certain qualities of humans, such as intelligence or autonomy. According to 
some authors, this similarity implies that they can be recognized as both subjects of moral standards 
and subjects of law [44, p. 494]. 
The discussion of moral issues and AI in the previous paragraphs leads to several definite 
conclusions. First of all, since modern AI systems do not have the common enough characteristics 
with people, we have no moral obligation to recognize them as subjects of law. The second 
conclusion is that there is no reason to believe that this is impossible in the future. Back in 1992, 
some researchers stated that “if AI behaved externally correctly and if cognitive science confirmed 
that the main processes that generate such behavior would be relatively similar to processes in the 
human mind, we would have a very good reason to relate to AI as subjects of moral and legal norms. 
Moreover, in the future, when we interact with similar AIs..., we will be forced to clarify our 




Summing up, we can conclude that potentially AI can be a subject of law. People have no moral 
obligation to provide a legal capacity to intelligent systems because they have little in common with 
a person, however, some states can formally do this. The experience associated with endowing the 
legal personality of legal entities shows us that the corresponding legal structures for recognizing AI 
as a subject of law already exist. 
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